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Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing 
Honderich’s Third Way
Paul Russell
In the third and final part of his A Theory of Determinism (1988), Ted 
Honderich addresses the fundamental question concerning “the con-
sequences of determinism” (1988, II, 4).1 That is, what follows if 
determinism is true? This question is, of course, intimately bound up 
with the problem of free will and, in particular, with the question of 
whether or not the truth of determinism is compatible or incompati-
ble with the sort of freedom that is supposed to be required for moral 
responsibility. It is Honderich’s aim to provide a solution to “the prob-
lem of the consequences of determinism,” and a key element of this is 
his attempt to collapse the familiar Compatibilist/Incompatibilist 
dichotomy. More specifically, Honderich offers us a third way—the 
response of “Affirmation” (2002, 125–126). Although his account of 
Affirmation has application and relevance to issues and features beyond 
P. Russell (*) 
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada 



















freedom and responsibility, my primary concern in this chapter will be 
to examine Honderich’s  theory of “Affirmation” as it concerns the free 
will problem as it is generally understood.
9.1  I
The first part of Honderich’s overall position in A Theory of Determinism 
is concerned with “the question of whether there does exist a conceptu-
ally satisfactory determinist theory of our lives” (1988, 4). The second 
part addresses the question of whether the theory as articulated in the 
first part and argues that it is well supported. The core of this theory, as 
Honderich interprets it, is expressed in these terms:
determinism is only a view of our own nature—in essence, the view that 
ordinary causation is true of us and our own lives, that in our choosing 
and deciding we are subject to causal laws. In this use of the word, deter-
minism comes to no more that a yes answer to the question of whether 
we are in one fundamental way like plants or machines. Determinism in 
this sense does not include or imply an answer to the question of whether 
we are free or not. That question, maybe surprisingly, is left pretty well 
untouched. (2002, 3)
The account of the theory of determinism is developed by Honderich 
largely in terms of a theory of causation and laws, along with an accom-
panying theory of mind and action. The theory of causation is one that 
holds that causes necessitate their effects, such that, given the occur-
rence of the former, whatever else happens, the latter will also occur 
(2002, 14–15). Causal relations and natural laws are understood as in 
terms of “regularities or as nomic connections” (2002, 15–16). Given 
this general account of causation, the question arises of whether or not 
“our lives are a matter of effects … events that really have to happen 
because of earlier causal circumstances” (2002, 21). To answer this 
question, as it concerns our choices and actions, Honderich advances 


































There are three basic elements to Honderich’s account of mind and 
action. The first is what he calls Mind-Brain Determinism. This concerns 
the suggestion that each mental or conscious event, including choosing 
and deciding, is nomically related to neural events in such a way that the 
“neural event by itself or together with some other non-mental thing 
necessitated the mental one” (2002, 63). The second component is 
“Intuition Determinism,” which maintains that nomically related neural 
and mental events have their causal origins in bodily (and environmental) 
events that involve no mental events. The third, and last, component in 
this general account of mind and action is “Action Determinism,” which 
claims that each and every action is the effect of an “active intention,” 
what is sometimes referred to as a volition or act of willing (2002, 59–60). 
The details of these three elements of Honderich’s theory of mind and 
action involve, of course, a number of controversial issues but for our 
present purposes what matters is that they serve as the background set of 
proposals and assumptions that serve to articulate the general theory of 
determinism and bring us directly to the problem of the “consequences” 
(so interpreted). It is worth noting that Honderich does not assert simply 
“that determinism is true.” What he claims is that it is “strongly sup-
ported, and that certainly it has not been shown to be false” (2002, 90 
[original emphasis]). Honderich also allows that there may be some 
“micro-indeterminism” at the level of small particles it is “not amplified 
into indeterminism at the macro-level” (2002, 74–76). Even if micro- 
determinism is true, we are still left with strong support for the truth of a 
“macro-determinism” or “near-determinism” (2002, 90).
Throughout his account of a deterministic theory of mind and action, 
Honderich makes clear that there is an opposing view—namely, what he 
calls the “philosophy of Free Will,” which presupposes the truth of inde-
terminism (2002, 2, 4, 35, 41–42, 49, 69, 76). What philosophers of 
Free Will require is that responsible agents are originators of their actions. 
If we are genuinely free, each of us must have “a kind of personal power 
to originate choices and decisions and their actions” (2002, 2). It will not 
suffice for us to be mere “initiators” of our actions in a manner that is 
consistent with these events to be (necessitated) effects via a causal chain 
or process (2002, 3). The guiding aim behind the idea of Free Will, 




































Honderich argues, is that we need to understand responsibility in a cer-
tain way. What this requires, above all, is that we are “able now to choose 
differently from how we do, given the present and ourselves exactly as 
they are and the past exactly as it was” (2002, 41–42; and cp. 98, 109, 
117). This form of absolute responsibility not only requires the falsity of 
determinism it also requires some sort of “ongoing entity” that possesses 
the “active power” required to produce or not produce a given action 
(2002, 42, 49). If we accept the truth of (near) determinism, then we 
must reject the idea of Free Will, so understood.
What is the significance of having to abandon or discard the idea of 
Free Will? Honderich analyses this issue within wider fabric of what he 
refers to as a set of “life-hopes.” Life-hopes involve our attitudes to a range 
of features of the world that we care about, particularly as this concerns 
how our future activities may affect or influence how our lives unfold. In 
respect of these matters, we may be fortunate or unfortunate and, depend-
ing on this, we will feel a general attitude of a positive or negative kind. 
An attitude is an “evaluative thought” about something that we either 
approve or disapprove of. The question that presents itself in relation to 
determinism is, therefore, whether our life-hopes are in some relevant way 
threatened or damaged if the thesis of determinism is true.
It is with respect to this matter that the loss of Free Will is of some 
concern. The idea of Free Will, as we noted, involves a conception of 
ourselves as agents that are true originators of our actions. There is, 
Honderich maintains, a set of life-hopes that rests on this stronger con-
ception of free agency (2002, 93, 111–112). We want to be able not just 
to achieve success but to earn it and we want our achievements, whatever 
they are, to be more than just a causal product of our inherent nature and 
environment. While this is of importance to us if determinism is true, we 
do not have it (2002, 104). This situation will license an attitude of dis-
may about our predicament and circumstances so understood. It is for 
this reason, Honderich suggests, “that many people have found deter-
minism to be a black thing” (2002, 95; and cp. 104).
Life-hopes are not, however, the only things that rest on the concept of 
freedom understood in terms of origination. Among other things that 
depend on this notion of initiated action as originated are certain attitudes 
or personal feelings to other people on the basis of their conduct toward 







































are closely bound up with our moral feelings and responses—an issue that 
has been the primary focus of attention in the free will debate. What is 
crucial here is that the concept of freedom as originated action is essential 
to moral responsibility. The moral standing of an individual, on this 
account, rests on the assumption that they have not just acted voluntarily 
but possess the power to originate their actions and could have acted oth-
erwise in the same circumstances. If these metaphysical foundations of 
agency are threatened, the whole fabric of morality will collapse, including 
our understanding of retributive justice and (deserved) punishment 
(2002, 101). Our sense of dismay, in face of the apparent truth of deter-
minism, is felt most strongly in relation to this issue.
It is at this juncture that the split between Compatibilism and 
Incompatibilism becomes relevant. The analysis provided so far is one 
that turns on a concept of freedom (i.e. origination) that the incompati-
bilist embraces and endorses as the only true or genuine account of free-
dom that is relevant to these modes of concern. From the perspective of 
compatibilism, however, this entire analysis is mistaken. It is mistaken 
because what we really mean by freedom is a matter of voluntariness—
not origination (2002, 96, 98). Free actions have a certain kind of causal 
history and are, as such, effects of a particular kind (2002, 96). When we 
secure a proper grasp of the concept of freedom, in terms of voluntari-
ness, we can draw all the relevant distinctions we need concerning moral 
responsibility (2002, 98–99). There is, therefore, according to the com-
patibilist no conflict between freedom and responsibility and the truth of 
determinism. Even if determinism is true, nothing changes and nothing 
we have reason to care about is threatened. Instead of dismay, the attitude 
of the compatibilist is one of “satisfied intransigence” (2002, 97).
It is Honderich’s central claim that neither of these approaches offers a 
satisfactory response to the likely truth of determinism. The oppositions 
we encounter between these two sides leave us in an unsatisfactory and 
unstable situation that demands a new response to determinism.
We need to get into a different way of feeling about determinism. We need 
to come to a response that takes into account not only its truth, and the 
two sets of attitudes, but also the two responses we have in the first instance, 
dismay and intransigence. So the final upshot, if we are to be successful, 
will partly be a response to the two initial responses. (2002, 122–123)





































Honderich’s response to compatibilism and incompatibilism is that they 
are both mistaken. Both, moreover, are mistaken over several overlapping 
claims that they are agreed about. The first of these is that we possess 
some single, ordinary idea of freedom and that the alternative conception 
is either inadequate or incoherent (or both). The truth about our situa-
tion, Honderich maintains, is that we plainly have two distinct ideas of 
free choice and action and that both compatibilists and incompatibilists 
are wrong to dismiss the alternative view as irrelevant to our appreciation 
of the consequences of determinism. Any proposed solution along these 
lines will inevitably be one-sided and incomplete and will fail to identify 
properly the (inescapable) split we experience in our dual responses and 
attitudes (i.e. both dismay and intransigence).
Honderich argues that both parties in this debate mistakenly suppose 
“that the problem of the consequences can be settled by logical, intellec-
tual, philosophical or linguistic means as traditionally conceived” (2002, 
114) This approach, he suggests, over-intellectualizes the whole problem. 
The real problem is that we have two sets of attitudes, rooted in two sets 
of desires, and they issue in the divergent responses we have considered—
dismay and intransigence. Neither response, taken by itself, is entirely 
satisfactory. Compatibilist intransigence comes across as mere “bluff” and 
requires us to suppress and ignore the other side of the equation. On the 
other hand, simple dismay also ignores essential and inescapable features 
of ordinary life and our social experience. The relevant problem is how 
this “Attitudinarian instability and discomfort can be overcome and the 
two parties reconciled” (2002, 125–126).
Honderich’s solution to this problem takes the form of what he calls 
“Affirmation” (2002, 126). What this requires is that, assuming the truth 
of determinism, we must
try to give up whatever depends on thoughts inconsistent with it. Above all 
we have to try to accept the defeat of certain desires. This is bound up with 
trying to be happier about, or more reconciled to, the desires in which we can 
persist, the ones consistent with determinism. (2002, 125)
This means in the first place, in accepting that “our attitudes involving 




































true, we cannot claim that “nothing changes” and that this “leaves things 
just as they are” (2002, 97, 99, 125). At the same time, making these 
 concessions “need not give rise to dismay, taking everything as wrecked” 
(2002, 125). By this route we achieve some balance between dismay and 
intransigence, whereby we recognize and accept that some things impor-
tant to us are discredited or lost, to the extent that they are based on 
assumptions about origination, but that there is also a great deal that we 
care about and that which matters to us remains untouched and survives.
Honderich summarizes his account of Affirmation as follows:
To put the proposal in a nutshell, our new response should be this: trying 
by various strategies to accommodate ourselves to the situation we find ourselves 
in—accommodate ourselves to just what we can really possess if determinism is 
true, accommodate ourselves to the part of our lives that does not rest on the 
illusion of Free Will. We can reflect on what is perhaps the limited worth of 
what we have to give up, consider the possible compensations of a belief in 
determinism, take care not to underestimate what we can have, and con-
sider a certain prospect having to do with genuine and settled belief in 
determinism. (2002, 126 [emphasis in original])
To embrace this response of “Affirrmation” is, Honderich suggests, to 
adopt “a philosophy of life,” one which consists in feelings that provide 
us with some support and as much satisfaction as the truth will allow. 
Although Affirmation rejects all forms or reliance on illusions of any 
kind, it nevertheless rejects any (pessimistic) suggestion that determinism 
leaves us “defeated” or without any substantial and significant sources of 
consolation. This is not just a matter of “putting a good face on things” 
but of recognizing gains as well as losses that come with the belief in 
determinism (2002, 131). Among the gains is that we are in a position to 
withdraw from retributive sentiments and practices that are grounded in 
our illusory belief in Free Will. This is all achievable without the world 
going “cold,” or leaving no scope for personal emotions and feelings, or 
losing all sense of achievement and meaning (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 
2014). The upshot of all this is that the response of Affirmation is one 
that rejects undiluted “dismay” or “intransigence” but offers, instead, a 
blend or mix that avoids the one-sided, monochromatic alternatives that 
have generally been advanced.





































Having reviewed the essential features of Honderich’s theory of 
“Affirmation,” we can now ask if this is indeed, as Honderich claims, the 
solution we have been seeking for “the problem of the consequences of 
determinism” (2002, 133). The short answer to this—as with the theory 
itself—is in some ways “Yes” and, in other ways, “No.” Let us begin with 
what seems to be right and illuminating about “Affirmation.” The best 
way to appreciate the significance of Affirmation is by locating it within 
the matrix of other available positions on offer. Affirmation is one of sev-
eral positions on this subject that involve significant modifications and 
amendments to the more familiar classical accounts. (As Honderich 
points out, neither the Compatibilist or Incompatibilist tradition is 
“absolutely uniform” (2002, 110).) Although several of these theories 
contain overlapping or common elements, each takes a different turn on 
some key issues—and Affirmation needs to be distinguished from them 
in respect of these elements.
Affirmation is most obviously opposed to the idea of Free Will, 
understood in terms of the form of origination that libertarians seek 
to secure. In this respect, Determinism and Affirmation plainly imply 
skepticism about the metaphysics of libertarian agency—which is, 
according to Affirmation, a persisting source of dismay. However, 
although Affirmation is skeptical about Free Will and origination, it 
rejects complete, global skepticism about freedom and responsibility. 
The reason for this is that it rejects the suggestion that origination is 
our (sole) true idea of freedom. According to Affirmation, voluntari-
ness serves as one kind of freedom and provides a basis for surviving 
credible forms of responsibility based upon it. It follows from this 
that any unqualified form of dismay or pessimism cannot be sup-
ported or sustained, simply because origination is incompatible with 
the truth of determinism. Affirmation, therefore, rejects “incompati-
bilist” arguments about freedom and responsibility, and any unquali-
fied pessimism that it may be taken to license on the ground that they 
fail to accommodate the dual nature of our concepts of freedom and 




































Not all skeptics about freedom and moral responsibility take  themselves 
to be committed to dismay or pessimism as a metaphysical attitude that 
flows from the truth of determinism. An important recent development 
in the free will debate has been an effort, by Derk Pereboom, Gregg 
Caruso and others, to defend “Hard Incompatibilism” or “Optimistic 
Skepticism,” which holds that the only form of freedom that grounds 
desert-based theories of responsibility is origination and that, although 
this is impossible, no deep or unqualified pessimism flows from this. On 
the contrary, there are, they claim, significant benefits to this skeptical 
outlook (see, e.g. Pereboom 2001; Waller 2011; Caruso, forthcoming). 
There are certainly some important affinities between Honderich’s 
Affirmation and “Hard Incompatibilism,” but, as Honderich shows, 
there remain important points of divergence (2002, 143). One aspect of 
this is that Affirmation remains firmly committed to the stance of dismay 
(or pessimism)—rooted in skepticism about the idea of Free Will—which 
is a stance that Hard Incompatibilism aims to discredit or minimize. The 
crucial point here is that Affirmation refuses to deny the source of dismay 
that determinism generates, as grounded in skepticism about the 
(Incompatibilist) idea of Free Will or origination.
One further theory that we should consider in this context is “Illusion,” 
as advanced and defended by Saul Smilansky (2000, 36–38). As with 
Hard Incompatibilism, Smilansky’s “Illusionism” bears some family 
resemblance to Affirmation. One important feature they share is a “dual-
ist” view about the nature of freedom and responsibility, which denies 
that we have just one conception which renders either Compatibilism or 
Incompatibilism true or false. Where they diverge, however, is that 
“Illusionism” takes the importance of origination to be so deep and per-
vasive in our ethical lives that for practical reasons we should encourage 
and promote belief in origination—even if we have some theoretical rea-
son for doubting it (e.g. evidence of the truth of determinism). For 
Illusionism, the truth of determinism and abandoning the idea of free 
will would be so catastrophic and disastrous for our ethical and social 
lives that we must reject any option or theory that would encourage skep-
ticism about the idea of Free Will. This is a view that Honderich,  explicitly 
rejects. The philosophy of life that Affirmation embraces insists that the 




































path of Illusion is neither necessary nor desirable and that Affirmation 
secures all that is needed to sustain and support a worthwhile life and a 
viable ethical community (2002, 126, 131–132).
Where does this taxonomy of Affirmation in relation to other alterna-
tive views leave us? In my view, Affirmation not only presents a distinc-
tive stance and position on this issue, on all the points and issues that 
separate it from its alternatives mentioned above, it generally takes the 
right view. Affirmation is correct, for example, to reject “Monism” about 
the concept of freedom as it concerns moral responsibility. Related to 
this, it is right to reject any unqualified skepticism about freedom and 
responsibility, along with any unqualified pessimism or dismay that may 
be based on it. Finally, I would also agree that Affirmation is right to 
repudiate “Illusionism” as a way of dealing with the “probable” truth of 
determinism, insist instead on being truthful about our human predica-
ment. In several respects Affirmation shares some of the key merits and 
strengths in P.F. Strawson’s influential contribution to this topic in his 
paper “Freedom and Resentment.”2 Along with Strawson, Affirmation 
places emphasis on moral sentiments or reactive attitudes in accounting 
for moral responsibility. Both aim to “reconcile” the main parties in this 
dispute by means of accepting some of their claims and not others and 
present a position that gives us a recognizable picture of human agents as 
part of the natural world. However, what does separate Affirmation from 
Strawson’s theory is that it does not claim to “leave things just as they are” 
(2002, 99). Affirmation insists on recognizing the real losses, as well as 
the gains, that come with this philosophy of life (2002, 126, 131). In all 
these respects, so it seems to me, Affirmation is firmly on the right track 
and highly illuminating.
Having indicated what makes Affirmation distinctive, illuminating, 
and credible, let me now consider some other important matters in 
respect of which it is less convincing. In order to do this, I want to com-
pare Affirmation with another perspective on the free will problem—a 
view I will call Free Will Pessimism (Russell 2017a). The label Free Will 
Pessimism does not involve a metaphysical attitude that is based on 
some form of free will skepticism. On the contrary, whereas free will 
skepticism is the view that our vulnerability to conditions of fate and 







































(e.g. as implied by the truth of determinism), Free Will Pessimism rejects 
free will skepticism. The basis of its pessimism rests with the assumption 
that we are free and responsible agents who are, nevertheless, subject to 
fate and luck. According to Free Will Pessimism, all the major parties 
and positions in free will debate (both Compatibilists and Incompatibilists) 
are committed to modes of evasion and distortion regarding our human 
predicament in respect of agency and moral life. The question that 
arises, therefore, is whether or not the “dualism” involved in Affirmation, 
in respect of both its understanding of two concepts of freedom and the 
associated split in our metaphysical attitudes, effectively identifies and 
overcomes these modes of evasion?
In order to describe the alternative picture that Free Will Pessimism 
presents of the free will problem as it relates to the consequences of deter-
minism, we need to consider, first, the core incompatibilist argument 
against all compatibilist strategies and proposals. Let us call this incom-
patibilist argument the Basic Exclusion Argument (BEA):
 1. There is a set of conditions φ (under some contested interpretation) 
such that an agent is free and responsible for an action or set of actions 
when these conditions are satisfied.
 2. There is another set of conditions β (under some contested interpreta-
tion) such that an agent’s action or set of actions are subject to fate and 
luck when those conditions are satisfied.
 3. Any action (or set of actions) that satisfy φ cannot be such that it also 
satisfies β. That is to say, if an action X satisfies φ it cannot also be 
subject to β. < Exclusion Premise (EP) >.
 4. Any and all compatibilist interpretations of φ are such that they may 
be satisfied and still be subject to β (i.e. compatibilist conditions φ* do 
not support or satisfy EP/ #3 above).
___
 5. It follows that we must reject any and all compatibilist interpretations 
φ*, as they are inadequate as judged by a standard that compatibilists 
do not and cannot reject (EP).
Libertarians believe that their own interpretation of conditions φ can 
satisfy EP and avoid the skeptical conclusion, although this requires the 
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falsity of determinism. Skeptics maintain that there is no avoidable set of 
conditions φ that serve to satisfy EP and, hence, the skeptical conclusion 
goes through either way—whether determinism is true or false.
Proponents of BEA are entirely justified in claiming that compatibil-
ists have consistently adhered to EP and aimed to satisfy it. What com-
patibilists have denied is premise #4, the claim that compatibilism fails to 
satisfy the standard set by EP (premise #3). Let us consider, then, the 
classical compatibilist argument that is launched against premise #4, an 
argument aiming to show that agents who satisfy suitably interpreted 
compatibilist conditions (φ*) are not subject to fate and luck (i.e. condi-
tions β). The core feature of this argument is that the incompatibilist 
claim (premise #4) relies on a basic confusion between fatalism and 
determinism. More specifically, if we properly interpret conditions β (i.e. 
as conditions β*), then premise #4 is groundless. Fatalism is the doctrine 
that all our deliberations and actions are causally ineffective and make no 
difference but nothing about the thesis of determinism implies that this 
is the universal condition (see, e.g. Ayer 1954, 22–23; and especially 
Dennett 1984, 104–105, 129).
This line of response, aimed at refuting premise #4, may be found 
doubly unconvincing. First, appealing to this distinction between deter-
minism and fatalism is a shallow and evasive understanding of incom-
patibilist concerns. The relevant issue is not about the causal influence of 
the agent but rather the causal influence on the agent. On the assumption 
of determinism, however complex the mechanisms or capacities involved, 
the ultimate source or origin of conduct and character is external to the 
agent and not within the agent’s control or influence. For this reason, we 
need to distinguish “contributory fatalism,” which concerns the universal 
causal impotence of agents, from “origination fatalism,” which concerns 
the causal source or origins of an agent’s conduct and character and the 
limits of control over this. Whereas determinism does not imply univer-
sal contributory fatalism, it does imply universal origination fatalism—
and it is this that is found particularly troubling (Russell 2000, 2017a).3
The second objection flows from the first. Given the issue of origina-
tion fatalism and the limits of control over conduct and character, as 
generated on compatibilist models, we run directly into worries about 






































evaluation (i.e. reactive attitudes etc.) in ways that are sensitive to factors 
they do not control (Nagel 1976). Granted that it is intuitively unjust to 
hold agents responsible for aspects of their conduct and character that 
they do not control (as per EP, premise #3), conditions of freedom and 
responsibility cannot be sustained in these circumstances where an agent 
is subject to fate and luck along the lines described. The familiar compati-
bilist line of response to this, consistent with much contemporary com-
patibilist thinking, is that human agents are “not just lucky,” we are 
“skilled self-controllers” (Dennett 1984, 94). Once again, however, this 
general line of reply seems not to engage with the real force or basis of 
incompatibilist concern. Incompatibilists recognize, of course, that com-
patibilist accounts of self-control and reason—responsiveness do not 
leave us “merely lucky” or unskilled, unable to enhance our abilities and 
talents. The point is, rather, that the specific capacities we have, the way 
we actually exercise them, and the occasions we are provided for employ-
ing them, all depend, given deterministic assumptions, on external fac-
tors and conditions no agent ultimately has control over.
On this account, the free will problem, as generally understood, turns 
on the assumption that EP is correct and that the most effective compati-
bilist strategy depends on refuting premise #4. Incompatibilists claim that 
this cannot be done and that determinism implies skepticism about free-
dom and responsibility. There is, however, an alternative strategy we may 
call “Critical Compatibilism.” Critical Compatibilism accepts premise #4 
and agrees with incompatibilists that orthodox compatibilist attempts to 
refute are shallow and evasive and, as such, fail. At the same time, critical 
compatibilists reject the skeptical conclusion because they reject EP/
premise #3. According to Critical Compatibilism, any plausible form of 
compatibilism must recognize and acknowledge the influence of fate and 
luck on the manner and context in which our capacities of rational self-
control operate. In taking this view, critical compatibilism maintains that 
any plausible form of compatibilism must accept Free Will Pessimism, 
which allows that free and responsible agents may still be subject to sig-
nificant forms of fate and luck (contrary to the requirements of EP).
An important feature of Critical Compatibilism is the particular set of 
metaphysical attitudes that this stance naturally licenses or occasions. In 
circumstances where EP is not satisfied, we have (deep) reasons for being 





































“troubled” or “disconcerted” by our predicament as this relates to human 
ethical life and moral agency. Even if we are “fortunate” in this particular 
ethical trajectory our lives may take, there is no basis—as incompatibilists 
rightly insist—for an easy optimism when fate and luck intrude into our 
ethical lives and the way we may exercise our moral agency. The crucial 
point, in relation to Critical Compatibilism, is that a pessimism (or sense 
of “dismay”) of this nature is not rooted or grounded in skepticism about 
free will and moral responsibility. On the contrary, it presupposes that we 
reject any skepticism of this kind, since the form of pessimism that is 
occasioned depends on viewing ourselves and others as agents who are 
free and responsible but, nevertheless, subject to fate and luck in the exer-
cise and operation of our moral capacities.
With this understanding of the central features of Free Will Pessimism 
in place, we may now turn back to Affirmation and ask where it stands in 
relation to Free Will Pessimism? We can begin by asking, more specifi-
cally, where Affirmation stands on the issue of whether to accept or reject 
EP (premise #3 of BEA)? Clearly, Affirmation may go in one or other of 
two directions. Affirmation may be interpreted—and, on the face of it, is 
most plausibly interpreted—as offering a “dualist” response to EP which 
holds that it is both satisfied and not satisfied, depending from which side 
of the Compatibilist/Incompatibilist fence we are viewing it. Given the 
truth of Determinism and the consequent impossibility of origination or 
Free Will, Affirmation will agree with Incompatibilists that EP cannot be 
satisfied in terms of this concept—and this will license our sense of dismay 
based on skepticism about freedom and moral responsibility (as sug-
gested by BEA). This is, however, only one side of the mixed dualism of 
Affirmation. Since we have another concept of freedom, understood in 
terms of voluntarism, which allows for a different set of implications rela-
tive to freedom and responsibility, EP may be satisfied by the relevant set 
of Compatibilist standards. This is the case, if we accept the orthodox 
compatibilist project, which turns on a refutation of premise #4 (and an 
acceptance of EP).
If Affirmation is interpreted in the manner described above, then 
neither of its dualist components involves rejecting or discrediting EP 
and embracing any form of Free Will Pessimism. The Incompatibilist 
side holds that EP cannot be satisfied but must be respected (hence the 







































be satisfied, as long as we do not conflate modes of freedom and respon-
sibility secured by voluntariness with those that are based on origina-
tion or Free Will. According to Affirmation, both these views can be 
held together, without contradiction. The two views, along with their 
accompanying set of attitudes, can be simultaneously held and are insu-
lated from each other because both rest on ideas and concepts that are 
equally firmly rooted in ordinary life. For this reason, given the truth of 
Determinism, our reflections about EP will generate a measure of both 
dismay and intransigence—such that the truth of Determinism neither 
leaves our lives in ruins nor leaves everything unchanged and where it 
was. The crucial point remains, however, that although dismay attaches 
to the loss of origination, it does not generate any form of Free Will 
Pessimism, since, on both sides, Affirmation remains committed to 
respecting EP (if not satisfying it). Affirmation, so interpreted, denies 
the very possibility of Free Will Pessimism (i.e. it accepts EP as it 
appears in BEA). Another way of putting this point is that, along with 
the orthodox Compatibilist, Affirmation holds that Compatibilists 
should hold onto EP but reject premise number #4, which claims that 
Compatibilist conditions may be satisfied while agents are still subject 
to fate and luck. The Compatibilist element of Affirmation is, on this 
account, orthodox and not Critical Compatibilist in content. Like 
other views in the free will debate, Affirmation does not take the 
step taken by Critical Compatibilists and Free Will Pessimism, which 
involves discarding the entire ambition of satisfying EP or to find a 
“solution” conceived in these terms.
Although Affirmation may be interpreted in these terms, it is unsettled 
and open-ended enough, in relation to these matters, that another inter-
pretation is available to it. Affirmation may accept, with Critical 
Compatibilism, that any plausible and credible form of Compatibilism 
must accept and embrace Free Will Pessimism. That is to say, the 
Compatibilist component of Affirmation would not only reject simple 
intransigence because Determinism implies skepticism about origination 
and the idea of Free Will, but also because Compatibilism, understood in 
terms of freedom and moral responsibility based on voluntarist views, has 
its own independent sources of pessimism. This distinct and independent 
source of pessimism is the claim that free and responsible agents 
(in Compatibilist terms) are still subject to significant modes of fate and 






































luck. All orthodox Compatibilist efforts to dismiss this (via  refutations of 
premise #4) are rejected as themselves evasive and shallow responses to a 
more truthful account of the human  predicament. On this interpretation, 
therefore, there is nothing about Affirmation that precludes it from endors-
ing Free Will Pessimism. The difficulty with Affirmation, as presented, is 
that despite its other insights, it fails to provide a clear assessment of these 
issues relating to EP and Free Will Pessimism, leaving its Compatibilist 
component indeterminate with respect to these important matters.
One reason why these matters are of such importance is that the sort 
of “solution” we are looking for here depends on how we understand the 
problem of Determinism in relation to the free will problem. Honderich 
presents Affirmation as a solution to the problem of Determinism based 
on its dual “Attitudinarian” components (2002, 104, 120–121, 122, 126, 
133). He presents Affirmation as restoring a kind of balance and stability 
in our divergent and contrary responses to the truth of Determinism and 
as providing us with a “philosophy of life” that allows us to recognize and 
accept certain losses while retaining sufficient resources to carry on with 
some comfort and confidence. The difficulty we are faced with, however, 
is to identify carefully and precisely the relevant persisting sources of dis-
may or pessimism and how exactly they relate to the Compatibilist side 
of Affirmation. As presented, Honderich’s account seems to locate all rel-
evant sources of dismay with the loss of origination. If the Critical 
Compatibilist is correct, this is a mistaken and inadequate analysis of the 
problem. It is not just that we cannot satisfy the aim and aspirations of 
EP in Incompatibilist terms but that we need to discard EP altogether as 
a standard for an acceptable solution to the freewill problem (a matter 
which even the skeptic is mistaken about). The cost of rejecting or dis-
carding EP as a basic assumption for assessing proposed “solutions” to the 
free will problem is that we must allow that free, responsible agents are 
still subject to fate and luck—and this is something that is independently 
disturbing and troubling and plainly cannot be based on any general 
skepticism about freedom and responsibility. If Affirmation embraces 
Free Will Pessimism, then it must abandon any suggestion that it is a 
“solution” to the free will problem conceived in terms of the ambition to 
satisfy EP on some relevant interpretation. The Free Will Pessimist claims 






































troubling predicament to be acknowledged. All the major parties in the 
free will debate—including orthodox Compatibilists—are resistant to 
the suggestion that free, responsible agents may still be subject to signifi-
cant modes of fate and luck. What still needs to be clarified, however, is 
where Affirmation stands on this matter.
The foregoing problem is indicative of weaknesses in Affirmation’s 
commitment to the two concepts/two attitudes formula at the heart of 
its analysis. The split between Compatibilism and Incompatibilism that 
serves as the framework of its analysis conceals what all the traditional 
parties share—namely, a commitment to standards of freedom and 
responsibility that satisfy EP. As we have noted, even the skeptic shares 
this standard, taking the view that EP must be respected, even if it can-
not be satisfied. It is this more fundamental conception that is the real 
obstacle, not just for understanding the consequences of the truth of 
Determinism, but for understanding the truth about the human pre-
dicament with respect to agency, whether (near) Determinism is true or 
not. The question we need to ask, at this juncture, is why have compati-
bilists been so reluctant to embrace critical compatibilism and Free Will 
Pessimism? I have provided a more extended answer to this question 
elsewhere, but for now a brief summary will suffice (Russell 2017a). 
What is it about EP that orthodox compatibilists find so difficult to 
abandon? There are, I suggest, two considerations that run deep in ortho-
dox compatibilist thinking that account for this resistance to jettisoning 
EP. The first concerns the relationship between the exclusion premise 
and “the morality system” and the second, related to the first, concerns 
the question of optimism.
With respect to the first point, the exclusion premise may be under-
stood as an essential feature of what Bernard Williams calls “the morality 
system” (1985, Ch. 10). Among the various distinguishing features of 
“the morality system” is its insistence that moral responsibility, rightly 
understood, must somehow be capable of “transcending luck,” provid-
ing a purity that only genuine “rational” agency of some kind makes 
possible (Williams 1985, 217; see also Nagel 1976). Although orthodox 
Compati bilists resist the aspirations of libertarians to secure some form 
of absolute or ultimate agency (qua origination), they remain commit-
ted to the particular conception of responsibility encouraged by the 
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morality system and believe that it can be satisfied within compatibilist 
constraints (see, e.g. Wallace 1994, 39, 64–66). It is these aims and aspi-
rations that Critical Compatibilism rejects. The trouble with Affirmation, 
from this point of view, is that, on the face of it, it simply absorbs or 
incorporates the orthodox Compatibilist aims and assumptions of the 
morality system into its own proposed “solution” to the problem. If this 
is the case, then both components or dimensions of Affirmation theory 
retain the problematic baggage of “the morality system” and its peculiar 
aims and assumptions.
The second point is intimately concerned with the first. A further 
feature of “the morality system” is its aspiration to secure optimism of a 
certain kind—a comforting and consoling picture about our ethical 
lives and predicament. This feature of “the morality system” is deeply 
resistant to any account that suggests that the exercise and operation of 
our moral and rational capacities depends on large measure on factors 
that are not controlled or governed by those same capacities and pow-
ers. All the parties in the freewill debate—libertarians, compatibilists, 
and skeptics alike—hold onto EP and the particular form of optimism 
that it insists on. This form of optimism denies the very possibility of 
Free Will Pessimism, much less accepts it as the truth about our human 
predicament.
We may, in light of the above, ask to what extent Affirmation remains 
committed to this form of optimism as secured by an adherence and 
commitment to EP? It is certainly evident that, unlike orthodox 
Compatabilism or libertarianism, Affirmation dispenses with any pure or 
simple optimism. It insists, more specifically, on the need to accommo-
date “dismay” as having a secure foothold, given the truth of Determinism. 
However, as has also been explained, this form of dismay is grounded 
entirely in skepticism and the origination of free will. Retaining this form 
of dismay is consistent with remaining committed to an optimism that 
rejects the very possibility of Free Will Pessimism (e.g. the skeptic may be 
pessimistic because EP cannot be satisfied but will not allow that EP 
should be discarded or abandoned altogether). As things stand, it is not 
clear whether Affirmation is able or willing to accommodate forms of 
dismay or pessimism based on rejecting EP and the associated aims and 






































Let me conclude by describing an analogy that may help us to 
 appreciate both the strengths and weaknesses of Affirmation. There is an 
aspect of Affirmation that we may think of in terms of the Duck/Rabbit 
Gestalt switch. It is a basic feature of Honderich’s overall argument that a 
single image is not the whole truth on this topic. To insist on one side or 
the other as having the whole truth, and the other as being mistaken, is 
an error that both compatibilists and Incompatibilists share. We can and 
should, it is argued, accommodate and reconcile the partial truth con-
tained in each perspective or position. We can, as it were, reconcile the 
view of the Incompatibilist Duck with that of the Compatibilist Rabbit, 
as long as we do not insist on the sole truth of either. Despite its attrac-
tions, however, this reconciliation project has its own vulnerabilities. 
More specifically, if Free Will Pessimism is right, both the Compatibilist 
and Incompatibilist components that are absorbed by Affirmation share 
a deeper and more problematic set of assumptions about the nature and 
conditions of freedom and moral responsibility. The aims and assump-
tions in question are those that are encouraged and endorsed by “the 
morality system.” It may be that Affirmation can distance itself from 
these shared aims and assumptions but, as presented, it does not do this 
and, to this extent, it fails to identify the deeper difficulties that present 
themselves with respect to the consequences of Determinism and its 
 relevance to the freewill problem as generally understood.4
Notes
1. My discussion in this chapter focuses largely on Honderich (2002), which, 
although it “follows the same path” as the earlier work, is intended to be 
more than a mere précis of it. As Honderich points out, How Free Are You? 
is not only shorter and more recent, it advances some new lines of 
 argument and interest (2002, 6–7). For all these reasons, it seems the best 
work to focus my attention on for the purpose of this chapter—but read-
ers should also consult Honderich’s first and larger work for more detailed 
arguments and discussions relating to his views.
2. There are several overlapping features of Honderich’s approach here 
that run parallel to P.F. Strawson’s famous contribution in “Freedom 


































and Resentment” (1962). This includes the importance of not “over- 
intellectualizing” this issue and, related to this, an understanding of 
this debate in terms of broadly optimistic and pessimistic metaphysical 
attitudes.
3. Whether we attach the label “fate” to this concern is merely a verbal mat-
ter—the substantial concern or issue remains with us.
4. It may be argued that Honderich’s commitment to a dualist picture of our 
conceptual commitment and metaphysical attitudes requires a richer 
genealogical approach—one that is more sensitive to how we (modern, 
Westerners) have acquired the aims and assumptions of “the morality sys-
tem” and its specific views about moral freedom and ethical life. This is 
certainly one feature that divides Honderich’s (ahistorical) approach from 
William’s more self-conscious genealogical account. See, in particular, 
Williams (1993).
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